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1 Introduction
Contests, in which individuals have the opportunity to expend costly resources in order to
affect the probabilities of winning a prize, are ubiquitous in everyday life. Examples include
promotion tournaments, political races, rent-seeking, elections, sports, and various market
competitions such as advertising or patent races (see Konrad (2009) for a broader discussion).
In many of these situations, a contest designer plans a contest with certain objectives in mind.
In sports, promotional tournaments, and social contests with positive externalities – to name
a few – maximizing total effort is usually the central objective.
The potential participants of a contest do not necessarily have even abilities or efficiencies.
A sufficiently uneven contest, however, has several disadvantages. It may fail to give a level
playing field to a historically disadvantaged or minority group. As a result, contestants from
a minority group may decide not to participate in the contest. It can also fail to elicit
significant efforts from weaker participants if they perceive their probability of winning to be
too small (Lazear and Rosen (1981) and Runkel (2006)). Knowing this, a stronger participant
also has limited incentives to exert high effort, and the overall effort exerted in a sufficiently
uneven contest is usually low. Hence, ex-ante differences in efficiencies or abilities among
participants are a matter of concern for a contest designer interested in maximizing total
effort.
In this context, Brown (2011) empirically finds that the presence of a ‘superstar’ – in this
case, an in-form Tiger Woods – serves to reduce the absolute performance (and implicitly,
the effort) of his fellow professional golfers. Sunde (2009) finds a similar effect in women’s
professional tennis.
It would be natural, therefore, to conclude that a contest designer should aim to level
the playing field, since it will make the contestants exert more effort. Handicapping – where
stronger participants are a priori weakened – is one such tool that is widely used in sports,
promotional tournaments and other types of contests. Firms that use contests as a motiva-
tional tool often handicap those of superior ability, or give head-starts to those with inferior
ability. Similarly, expenditure in political campaigns is often capped – thereby handicapping
the candidate with the richest connections (Che and Gale (1998)). It is also common to
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observe handicapping of an outsider in a local procurement auction, or in internal promo-
tional tournaments (Chan (1996)). One extreme policy used to handicap the most efficient
players is to exclude them altogether (Baye et al. (1993)). All these designs are implemented
essentially to ‘level the playing field’ for all the participants, to rescale the ex-ante likelihood
of winning for all the participants, and to incentivize participants to exert higher levels of
efforts in the contest. In sports this is known as ‘competitive balance’ and is an important
component when designing sports tournaments (Szymanski (2003), Fort and Maxcy (2003)).
Economists have also studied and analyzed the effects of handicapping in the context of
affirmative action. Overall, both theoretical and applied results support an employment of
affirmative action tools in the interests of higher effort as well as equality. Fryer and Loury
(2005) show that profile-specific affirmative actions can increase effort, and reduce inequality.
Fu (2006) shows that such policies may improve incoming test scores for an academic institu-
tion, while still admitting students from minority backgrounds. Similar results are confirmed
in different contest structures and information settings by Franke (2012a) and Calsamiglia et
al. (2013). Kirkegaard (2012) lays down mechanisms by which an affirmative action policy
can also improve effort. Empirically, the issue of levelling the playing field is supported by
Schotter and Weigelt (1992), who run a laboratory experiment with equal opportunity pro-
grams and affirmative actions. They show that such policies benefit the disadvantaged group
and at the same time increase the effort levels of all contestants. In addition, Balafoutas and
Sutter (2012) focus on the effect of various types of affirmative action on the participation
and performance of females in tournaments. They find that females are more likely to enter
competitions, and perform equally well or better, when affirmative action is used. Along the
same lines, Niederle et al. (2013) show that implementing affirmative action increases the
entry of females, and the benefit overshadows the cost of affirmative action. Furthermore,
in a similar setting as Brown (2011), Franke (2012b) investigates the area of amateur golf
tournaments and shows that handicapping the efficient players elicits higher effort in the
tournament. However, Girard (2016) shows, with data from Northern India, that the effect
of affirmative action – a mandatory quota in the local assembly for lower caste people – stops
once the mandatory quota is taken out.
Despite the predominant success of handicapping/affirmative action, implementation of
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such policies is not without danger. Contests between participants of comparable ability
may see more effort diverted to destruction (i.e., sabotage), rather than production.1 In a
political race this may take the form of negative smear campaigning, rather than a positive
focus on the issues (Skaperdas and Grofman (1995)). In a firm, sabotage could involve
the spreading of malicious rumours about a colleague (Lazear (1989)). In markets, this
may mean negative advertising or even introducing ways to increase rivals’ costs (Salop and
Scheffman (1983)). On a football (soccer) pitch, this may mean using fouls to stop rival teams
scoring (Deutscher et al. (2013)). Regardless of the setting, any increase in sabotage is to
the detriment of the contest designer. Fallucchi and Quercia (2016) find that introducing
an affirmative action policy increases the entry rate and performance of the disadvantaged
group, but retaliation may also increase. In a similar way, Leibbrandt et al. (2015) find that
introducing gender quotas may increase sabotage against women; they find that sabotage
is directed specifically towards women by women. Up until now, however, no study has
attempted to investigate whether the policies used to elicit higher effort, or reduce inequality,
actually increase sabotage in a field setting. In this paper we aim to answer this question.
We analyse an environment in which there is both handicapping and sabotage, by exam-
ining 19,635 horse races run in the U.K. in 2011 and 2012.2 Of these, 11,766 (59.9%) are
handicap races. In handicap races, horses within a range of abilities are permitted to take
part, but superior horses are given heavier weights so that all horses have a similar probabil-
ity of winning.3 The British Horse Racing Authority (BHA) Guide to Handicapping states
1Sabotage in static and dynamic contests has been considered by a number of authors (e.g. Lazear (1989),
Konrad (2000), Chen (2003), Kräkel (2005), Amegashie and Runkel (2007), Münster (2007), Soubeyran (2009)
and Gürtler and Münster (2010)). Although experimental evidence has been forthcoming (e.g. Harbring et
al. (2007), Harbring and Irlenbusch (2008) and Carpenter et al. (2010)) – see Dechenaux et al. (2015) for a
survey – there has been relatively little field analysis. Notable exceptions include the work of Garicano and
Palacios-Huerta (2014), del Corral et al. (2010), Balafoutas et al. (2012) and Deutscher et al. (2013) who
examine fouls, as a form of sabotage, in sports. Please see Chowdhury and Gürtler (2015) for a comprehensive
survey on sabotage in contests.
2Horse racing has been used by other authors to examine contest theory. For example, Lynch (2005) uses
Arabian horse racing data to examine how the structuring of the prize schedule, and the translation of effort
into reward, affects aggregate effort in contests. Coffey and Maloney (2010) use horse and dog racing data
to disentangle the effect of incentives and selection on effort in contests.
3Full details on the handicapping system in horse racing can be found on the British Horse Racing
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that
‘A handicap is a race for which horses are allotted weight, based on their ability on the
racecourse, to try to equalize their chances of winning... The Handicapper hopes to make the
race exciting and competitive for the owners and racegoers’
There is also a second ingredient to our data. The BHA investigates ‘interference’ between
horses during each race. Interference can include one horse knocking into another horse, a
horse forcing another off their racing line, and even cases of a jockey stealing another jockey’s
whip during the race.4 While interfering with another horse, the jockey is exerting effort to
reduce the likelihood of the victim winning. Interference is, in other words, sabotage. In
2011 and 2012 alone, there were 1,099 cases of interference.
We find that participants in handicap races are substantially more likely to commit sab-
otage than those competing in non-handicap races. The incidence of sabotage is particularly
high in close handicap races (as measured by the standard deviation in pre-race odds), and
even extends to close non-handicap races. In other words, a levelling of the field appears
to increase the likelihood of destruction in contest environments. Furthermore, we find that
there are strong incentives for jockeys to employ destructive strategies as it helps the sabo-
teur to improve his/her final rank and to win the race. The enactment of sabotage gains
the saboteur 1.43 places, on average, relative to the betting market’s pre-race expectations
of their finishing position. Combining these results, we conclude that if not taken care of,
sabotage may partially offset the benefits, in positive effort inducement and equality, that
arise with tools such as handicapping.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we provide a theoretical
benchmark of sabotage in contests. In Section 3 we outline the data relating to handicapping
and interference, and in Section 4 we conduct our empirical analysis. Section 5 concludes.
Authority website http://www.britishhorseracing.com.
4Lester Piggott is the most (in)famous jockey to commit such an offense, stealing the whip of Alain
Lequeux in a race in France in 1979 (The Times, November 15th 2008). He later explained that Alain ‘did
not seem to mind and [had] got no chance [of winning]’ (The Guardian, 14th December 2003).
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2 A Theoretical Benchmark
We introduce a simple model to show how actions that are intended to reduce ex-ante effi-
ciency difference among players may increase sabotage. We use a tournament model with
sabotage similar to Lazear (1989). There are two risk-neutral players, i and j, who compete
for a prize of value vi and vj respectively. Player i can either expend productive effort ei
that improves his own probability of winning; and/or can exert destructive sabotage si that
reduces the effort level of their rival, and as a result the probability of their rival winning.
Furthermore, Player i has ability ai that is given exogenously. Without loss of generality
assume ai > aj, i.e., Player i is a-priori more efficient than Player j. This type of specifica-
tion is common while considering ‘unfair’ contests and analysing the effects of asymmetry or
affirmative action tools, while keeping other effects the same (see, for instance, Schotter and
Weigelt (1992, pp. 517) or Gürtler and Gürtler (2015)).
Let us now denote this a-priori efficiency difference as 4a = ai − aj. The final output yi
produced by player i is given as
yi = ai + ei − αsj + i
for α < 1, and i is random noise. The output function is analogous for Player j. Exerting
effort and sabotage are both costly. Consider the total cost function as:
ci = c(ei, si)
The cost function has the following properties: c(0, 0) = 0, c1 > 0, c11 > 0, c2 > 0,
c22 > 0, c12 > 0, ensuring a standard convex shape.5 We further assume enough convexity
and Inada-type conditions that ensure the existence of an interior solution. Although we
do not explicitly model possible punishment as a consequence of detected sabotage, the cost
function implicitly incorporates exactly that. The convexity can imply a higher likelihood of
detection with sabotage, and also a higher level of punishment.
Following the standard procedures in Tournament models, the player with the highest
output wins the prize. Thus, the contest success function can be written as:
5Here a single subscript means first order partial derivative with the first or the second argument, and a
double subscript means a second order own or cross partial.
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pi =

1 if yi > yj
1
2 if yi = yj
0 if yi < yj
Hence, the pay-off function for Player i can be written as
pii = pivi − c(ei, si)
= p((ai + ei − αsj + i)− (aj + ej − αsi + j) > 0)vi − c(ei, si)
= p((4a+ (ei − ej)− α(sj − si)) > (j − i))vi − c(ei, si)
= G(4a+ (ei − ej)− α(sj − si))vi − c(ei, si)
where G(.) is the CDF of i − j, with unimodal PDF g(.).
Player i will try to maximize payoff pii with respect to ei and si. The first order conditions
are given as
∂pii
∂ei
= g(4a+ (ei − ej)− α(sj − si))vi − ∂c
∂ei
= 0 (1)
∂pii
∂si
= αg(4a+ (ei − ej)− α(sj − si))vi − ∂c
∂si
= 0 (2)
Similarly the pay-off function for Player j:
pij = (1−G(4a+ (ei − ej)− α(sj − si)))vj − c(ej, sj)
And the first order conditions to maximize pay-off are:
∂pij
∂ej
= g(4a+ (ei − ej)− α(sj − si))vj − ∂c
∂ej
= 0 (3)
∂pij
∂sj
= αg(4a+ (ei − ej)− α(sj − si))vj − ∂c
∂sj
= 0 (4)
From (1) and (3), we observe that ∂c
∂ei
/vi = ∂c∂ej /vj. Similarly, from (2) and (4), we obtain
∂c
∂si
/vi = ∂c∂sj /vj.
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Case 1: Symmetric Values
If vi = vj = v, then it follows that there exists a symmetric equilibrium, with e∗i = e∗j = e∗
and si∗ = sj∗ = s∗.6 The above first-order conditions then simplify to
g(4a)v = ∂c(e∗,s∗)
∂ei
and
g(4a)v = ∂c(e∗,s∗)
∂si
.
The convexity conditions of the cost function, c11 > 0 and c22 > 0, then imply that both
e∗ and s∗ are increasing in g(4a).
Recall that 4a = a1 − a2 is the a-priori efficiency difference. In a contest it may be
possible for the designer to reduce the efficiency difference either by employing handicapping
(decreasing ai) or by allowing head-starts (increasing aj). In either case, 4a goes down
and, given the shape of the PDF, g(4a) increases. This results in an expected increase in
equilibrium effort e∗. It is also simple to show that the probability that the most efficient
player wins decreases. However, as a by-product, the contest designer is also faced with a
higher level of sabotage s∗.
We have already discussed that some tools – such as handicapping – are implemented to
increase equilibrium efforts. However, it is clear that it is also in the interest of players to
increase their employment of sabotage when such tools are utilised. The act of sabotage is
detrimental to the other players, the designer and even agents unrelated to the contest (see
Chowdhury and Gürtler (2015) for a detailed discussion of this). Hence, while our model
indicates that an implementation of handicapping may help to achieve certain objectives of
the designer, it also increases the level of sabotage. Such sabotage may lessen or, in an
extreme case, offset the benefits achieved from the original increase in productive effort.
Case 2: Asymmetric Values
Now consider the case where vi 6= vj.
Then ∂c
∂ei
/ ∂c
∂ej
= vi
vj
Hence ∂c
∂ei
≷ ∂c
∂ej
if vi ≷ vj or ei ≷ ej if vi ≷ vj.
6We make additional necessary assumptions regarding the cross partial derivative ∂2c∂ei∂si to ensure that
no other equilibrium exists.
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Similarly, si ≷ sj if vi ≷ vj.
This means that irrespective of the efficiency, the player with the higher value expends
more effort as well as more sabotage in the equilibrium.
Now, let us consider the case when handicapping takes place, i.e. 4a = ai − aj goes
down. Recall Equation 1: g(4a + (ei − ej) − α(sj − si))vi = ∂c∂ei . Assume, without loss of
generality, that vi > vj. Then e∗i > e∗j , and as a result c(e∗i ) > c(e∗j) and c(s∗i ) > c(s∗j). So
when 4a decreases by the same amount for both the players, both the effort as well as the
sabotage exerted by both players will increase. However, as less effort or sabotage is needed
to increase the same amount of cost for player i than player j (due to convexity), the increase
in effort and sabotage by player i will be less than the increase in effort and sabotage by
player j.
Hence, the main result, that players exert more effort and sabotage as a result of hand-
icapping, remains the same even in the asymmetric version of the model, and the ex-ante
efficiency difference does not matter here. The increase in sabotage due to handicapping, by
the player with the higher value for the prize, is less than the increase in sabotage due to
handicapping by the player with the lower value for the prize. This is because the marginal
cost over the marginal benefit of exerting sabotage is not as great as for the player with the
lower valuation. In horse racing, where the horse-jockey combination with higher efficiency
often also has the higher value of the prize, we should expect a weaker horse to increase
sabotage by more than a stronger horse. However, this is difficult to test in our data because
we cannot identify the strength of horses prior to handicapping; we only have betting odds
after the handicapping has taken place.
Nevertheless, in the next two sections we will test our main hypothesis that handicapping
leads to greater sabotage.
3 Data
We obtained data on 19,635 U.K. horse races in 2011 and 2012 from Betwise (www.betwise.co.uk),
a betting information company. This data include information on the time and date of each
race, the class of the race (which ranges from 1 (top) to 7 (bottom)), the number of horses
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in each race, the prize money on offer to the winner, and the distance over which the race is
run. In addition, we have the type of race (e.g. flat – i.e., a standard race, and jump – i.e.,
a hurdle race or steeplechase) and whether or not the race was a handicap.
A slim majority (59.9%) of the races in our sample are handicap races. The regulatory
body in charge of horse racing, and indeed the racecourses, have to balance two elements
when deciding whether to schedule handicap or non-handicap races. On the one hand, bettors
are interested in the type of close races that are facilitated by handicapping, as uncertainty
creates an additional skill level to betting. On the other hand, fans of horse racing are keen to
see the best horses run unencumbered, at their full potential. As a result, only 38% of class
1 and 2 races in our sample, where the best horses participate, are handicaps. Nevertheless,
almost all (99.5%) race meetings will have at least 1 handicap race in its schedule. This
means that the majority of jockeys in our sample (60.9%) perform, at some point or another,
in both handicap races and non-handicap races. In our later analysis, we will exploit this
‘within-subject’ variation in the propensity to sabotage.
Supplementing our race data, we have information on each of the horses competing. This
includes the age of the horse, and also the bookmaker odds at the time the race begins,
otherwise known as the starting price. Summary statistics on race and horse data can
be found in Table 1. As expected, the standard deviation of the implied win probability
(calculated from the starting price) is larger for non-handicap races than for handicap races.
This reflects the fact that without handicapping, certain horses have very little chance of
winning.
[Insert Table 1 here]
We also require data related to interference. The BHA entrust multiple race stewards to
investigate and punish cases of interference. Information on all stewards’ enquiries relating
to interference can be found on the BHA webpage.7 Details of the procedures followed by
the stewards can be found in BHA Manual B Schedule 6. Below is a typical example of the
7www.britishhorseracing.com/resources/about/whatwedo/disciplinary/stewardsEnquiries.asp.
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output displayed after an enquiry, in this case from a race at Towcester on 10th January
2011.
‘The Stewards held an enquiry into possible interference approaching the final flight. They
found that the winner, BADGERS COVE (IRE) ridden by Charlie Poste, had interfered with
OVERNIGHT FAME, ridden by Denis O’Regan, placed second. They found Poste in breach
of Rule (B)54.1 and guilty of careless riding in that he allowed his mount to drift to the right.
They suspended him for 2 days as follows: Monday, 24th and Tuesday, 25th January 2011’.
If we assume handicap races are more competitive, horses will spend more time in close
proximity to each other in these races. We are therefore keen to distinguish between cases
of accidental interference (which may occur as a result of this proximity) and intentional
interference. The BHA procedures allow us to do precisely that. Consider the following case
of accidental interference from a race at Wolverhampton also on 10th January 2011. Such
cases are not classified as sabotage in our data-set.8
‘The Stewards noted that DAUNTSEY PARK (IRE), unplaced, had interfered with the
winner, BLACK COFFEE, at approximately five furlongs out, but after viewing a video
recording of the incident, they were satisfied that it was caused by accident. They therefore
took no further action’.
We married the data on guilty interference with the race and horse data described in Table
1. We only analysed data from racetracks with at least one incident of interference over the
two year sample. This was to ensure that racetracks outside of the BHA’s jurisdiction, or
racetracks with overly lenient stewards, did not cloud our analysis. We lose 25% of the data
as a result of excluding racetracks with no sabotage. Racetracks with no sabotage (in our
sample) predominantly play host to low grade, amateur racing. Amongst our remaining
observations, there were 1,099 cases of interference, of which 787 occurred in handicap races.
0.46% of competitors were guilty of interference in non-handicap races, but this rises to 0.68%
for handicap races. In the following section, we present our more formal analysis. For clarity,
we will now refer to interference as sabotage.
8Accidental interference is indeed slightly more common in handicap races than non-handicap races. This,
we assume, is partly due to the aforementioned proximity of competitors in handicap races.
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4 Analysis
4.1 Handicapping and Sabotage
The outcomes of handicap races are more uncertain than non-handicap races. Reflecting the
uncertainty created by handicapping, the favourite wins 41.43% of non-handicap races in our
sample, but only 27.5% of handicap races. Regression analysis, not displayed in the paper
for space reasons, also supports the view that handicapping is effective in levelling the field.
Having stated these findings, we now proceed to our main hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1. Sabotage is employed more in a handicap contest compared to a non-
handicap contest.
To test this hypothesis, in Table 2 we present two logit regressions relating to sabotage.
These regressions incorporate each horse performance, and consider horse-specific variables
such as age and implied win probability, rather than considering only race features. We
therefore cluster standard errors at the race-level. In Regression 1, an indicator variable,
equalling 1 if the jockey was a saboteur and 0 otherwise, is regressed on an indicator variable
equalling 1 if the horse was racing in a handicap race. The relationship is positive and
significant (at the 0.1% level). In Regression 2, we include control variables. Once again, the
relationship is positive and significant (at the 0.1% level), and gives an odds ratio of 1.57
of sabotage in a handicap race relative to a non-handicap race. In other words, destructive
effort is clearly more prevalent in handicap contests relative to non-handicap contests.
A closer look at our control variables also reveals that sabotage is more of an issue in
shorter races, increases with prize money (though much of this effect is captured by the
class of the race), is often carried out by horses in the prime of their careers (witness the
concave relationship between horse age and the propensity to engage in sabotage), and is
predominantly carried out by horses/jockeys with a good chance of victory (implied win
probability is positive and significant).9 However, most of these effects have weaker statistical
9It could be argued that heavily favoured horses are favoured, in part, because they engage in sabotage.
In other words, the betting market anticipates that a given competitor is likely to use sabotage and revises
their pre-race win probability accordingly. Contrary to this argument, later in our study we analyse the effect
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significance than the effect of handicapping. It is interesting to observe that sabotage occurs
more often, even after controlling for other factors, in flat races.
[Insert Table 2 here]
One problem with our empirical set-up is that jockeys are not randomly assigned across
races. There may therefore be a selection of jockeys with a propensity for sabotage into hand-
icap races. As noted earlier however, the majority (60.9%) of jockeys perform in both types
of races. This allows us to explore within-subject variation in the propensity to sabotage. In
other words, is a given jockey more likely to sabotage a competitor in a close handicap race
than a more uneven non-handicap race? In Table 3, we replicate the Table 2 analysis, but
this time include jockey fixed effects. The downside to this latest analysis is that we lose
21.1% of observations: any jockey that only commits sabotage in a handicap/non-handicap
race is necessarily excluded from the sample.
In Regression 1, an indicator variable, equalling 1 if the jockey was a saboteur and 0
otherwise, is regressed on an indicator variable equalling 1 if the horse was racing in a
handicap race. The size of the handicap coefficient declines with the inclusion of jockey fixed
effects, but remains positive and significant (at the 0.1% level). In Regression 2 we add the
control variables from earlier. Interestingly, many of the race variables – such as the indicator
for jump racing and the distance of the race – decline in significance after the inclusion of
jockey fixed effects. However, the handicap indicator remains significant, suggesting that a
given jockey is more likely to commit sabotage in a handicap race than a non-handicap race.
[Insert Table 3 here]
Our next set of analysis is intended to hone in on the mechanism behind this main result.
Are handicap races aﬄicted by more sabotage due to the evenness of the competitors, as
of sabotage on wins and finishing positions, and our results suggest that acts of sabotage – and the gains
that accrue to the saboteur – are not fully anticipated by the betting market. These results can be found in
Table 5, and Figures 1 and 2.
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the model in Section 2 suggests? Importantly, handicap races will differ in their closeness,
depending, amongst other things, on the competence of the handicapper. If the handicapper
does a poor job, or if important information on the quality of horses arrives after the weights
are decided, horses will go off at vastly different odds. Similarly, certain non-handicap races
may be very closely matched without a handicapper’s intervention. To get closer to estab-
lishing that handicapping drives sabotage, we should examine whether close races – both of
the handicap and non-handicap variety – attract more sabotage than less close races.
Our ex-ante measure of the closeness of the race is the standard deviation of implied win
probability. In Regression 1 of Table 4, we regress our saboteur indicator on this standard
deviation plus the other control variables used in Tables 2 and 3 (including the handicap
indicator). As expected, we find that sabotage is indeed more prevalent in close contests (i.e.
when the standard deviation of implied win probability in the race is low). However, the
handicap indicator does remain positive and significant after the inclusion of the standard
deviation of implied win probability, suggesting that handicapping has a direct impact on the
prevalence of sabotage. Nevertheless, the coefficient is diminished in comparison to Table 2
(0.329 compared to 0.453), suggesting that handicap races are aﬄicted by greater sabotage,
at least in part, because they are closer races.
In our next set of regressions we want to examine whether close races, either handicap
or non-handicap, attract more sabotage than less close races. In Regressions 2 and 3 of
Table 4 we therefore exclude the handicap race indicator and instead regress our saboteur
indicator on the remaining variables, but this time for sub-samples of handicap and non-
handicap races. In Regression 2 we find that there is a greater prevalence of sabotage in
close handicap contests (compared to less close handicap contests) with significance at the
5% level. In Regression 3 we find that close non-handicap races are also aﬄicted by higher
levels of sabotage than less close non-handicap contests (with significance at the 1% level). In
other words, the closer the race ex-ante, the more likely we are to observe sabotage, regardless
of whether the race is a handicap or not. This result gives us greater confidence that the
closeness created by handicapping is at least partially responsible for the higher levels of
sabotage in those races.
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[Insert Table 4 here]
There is an alternative explanation for our results. It is possible that stewards are simply
more vigilant in detecting and punishing sabotage in handicap races than they are in non-
handicap races. This may be because stewards expect sabotage to take place in close races, or
because they keep a keener eye on such incidents because sabotage is more likely to affect the
race outcome. The implication is that we may be over-estimating the effect of handicapping
on the propensity to sabotage. Unfortunately, this is not an alternative explanation that we
can exclude with the data, as we are forced to work under the assumption that detection
efforts are uniform across races.
4.2 Sabotage and Contest Outcomes
Our final aim in this study is to quantify the effect of sabotage on contest outcomes. It is
one aspect to establish that handicap contests are more susceptible to sabotage, but whether
this destructive practice actually works in the saboteur’s favour is still not clear. From
a theoretical point of view, it is simple to show that, ceteris paribas, a participant’s win
probability increases when a player exerts sabotage effort compared to when he or she does
not. We test the success of sabotage in our next hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2. Employment of sabotage improves the performance of the saboteur in
contests.
One issue in testing this hypothesis is that the finishing position of each horse, in the
Betwise data, is classified after any stewards’ enquiry has taken place. It is possible, therefore,
that a horse finished first after an act of sabotage, but was demoted to second place after the
stewards’ enquiry. In our data, this horse would be listed as finishing second. Fortunately,
such cases are quite rare. Reading through the BHA documentation (see page 14 of the BHA
Guide to Procedures 2009), and the reports of the stewards’ enquiries, we get the impression
that the stewards are discouraged from changing the final classification of races. This is
primarily because the counterfactual – where the horse would have finished if not for the act
of sabotage – is unobservable and difficult to predict. Moreover, with large sums sometimes
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staked on the outcome of these races, any arbitrary re-classification of finishing positions is
likely to prove controversial with bettors. Our impression from reading the reports is that
stewards seek to deter sabotage by suspending jockeys from future meetings, rather than
retrospectively amending the outcome of races.
In Panel A of Table 5 we regress an indicator variable equalling 1 if the jockey won the
race (as classified in the Betwise data), and 0 otherwise, on an indicator variable equalling
1 if the jockey was a saboteur, and on the implied win probability of the horse (as inferred
from the starting price). We find that sabotage does indeed improve the saboteur’s chances of
victory (significant at the 0.1% level) relative to the betting market’s pre-race expectations.
The coefficient associated with the saboteur indicator variable implies an odds ratio of 2.95
of a saboteur winning the race relative to a non-saboteur with the same pre-race prospects.
This result is most vividly captured in Figure 1. We plot the average win indicator (i.e. the
win frequency) for saboteurs, victims and uninvolved third parties. Compared to the implied
win probabilities, and using third parties as a reference point, saboteurs win more often than
their pre-race odds would suggest, while the prospects of victims are clearly hampered by the
saboteur’s actions. This is particularly apparent for lower implied win probabilities, where
there are more observations and where much of the noise is averaged out. This result is
particularly striking given that a few saboteurs may have had their positions downgraded
after a stewards’ enquiry.
[Insert Table 5 here]
In the remainder of Panel A we examine whether the effect is more pronounced in
handicap/non-handicap/jump and flat races. While sabotage is, initially, more likely to
be effective in handicap contests as the races are close, we would expect competitors to use
sabotage in both types of contests until the marginal impact is equal across each type of race.
Indeed, this appears to be the case as the coefficients across handicap and non-handicap races
are similar. The effect of sabotage on the saboteur’s win prospects are higher, however, in
jump races compared to flat races, suggesting that there are some unexploited opportunities
for sabotage in the former.
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[Insert Figure 1 here]
One problem with our initial choice of performance measure (whether the horse won
the race), is that the out-performance of the saboteur could be confounded with the well-
known favourite-longshot bias. This is the empirical regularity – dating from Griffith (1949)
– that the returns to betting on favourites exceed the returns to betting on longshots.10.
This means that favourites (longshots) will win more (less) often than their odds suggest.
As saboteurs are disproportionately favoured horses (see Table 2), the favourite-longshot
bias could generate the results in the top panel of Table 6 without sabotage actually being
beneficial for the saboteur.
To circumvent this issue we also used the following measure of performance used by Brown
(2012):
Performance = PredictedF inishingPosition− ActualF inishingPosition
NumberofHorsesinRace
(5)
The predicted finishing position is constructed by ordering the horses in each race by
their odds. Those with the shortest odds are predicted to finish first, those with the second
shortest odds are predicted to finish second, and so on. If Performance is negative, the horse
has underperformed, while a positive Performance signals out-performance. This measure
allows us to capture the effect of sabotage on the full spectrum of horses, unlike the previous
specification which focused only on the identity of one horse (the winner). This measure also
has a negative bias when it comes to favoured horses. For example, a horse predicted to finish
first can only under-perform (vice versa, a horse predicted to finish last can only outperform).
Therefore, in each of the following regressions we control for the predicted percentile of the
horse. For example, a horse predicted to finish 4th out of 14 horses would have a predicted
percentile of 100 ∗ (4/14) = 28.57th.
From Panel B of Table 5 we can see that the saboteur does indeed gain places (significant
at the 0.1% level). Judging by the size of the coefficients – and the average number of
10See Ottaviani and Sørensen (2008) for a survey of the explanations for the bias.
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horses in each race (see Table 1) – the saboteur finishes, on average, 1.43 positions higher
than betting market expectations as a result of their actions. We also replicate this analysis
for handicap/non-handicap/jump and flat race sub-samples. The overall result is captured
in Figure 2, where we average the performance measure for saboteurs, victims and third
parties for each predicted percentile (rounded to the nearest whole number) across the full
sample. Saboteurs significantly outperform expectations, while victims suffer relative to
pre-race expectations. This positional gain explains why saboteurs sabotage.
[Insert Figure 2 here]
5 Conclusion
Contests are a family of games where players make costly sunk investments in order to win
rewards. There are very many situations in the field in which contests are employed to select
winners for rewards. Tools such as handicapping, head-starts, caps on effort etc. are often
used in political and economic contests, sometimes for ethical reasons (e.g. in affirmative
actions), but also to increase the aggregate effort of unevenly able participants. The existing
literature show that these tools, in general, are capable of achieving the objectives of the
designer.
In this paper we introduce, for the first time, analyses of sabotage behaviour in contests
that use a handicapping tool to level the playing field. We show theoretically that imple-
mentation of such policies indeed increases equilibrium effort. However, as a by-product,
incidences of sabotage also increase. We utilise a unique data set from the British horse rac-
ing industry to empirically verify this second prediction. We demonstrate that participants
indeed display a greater propensity for destructive acts in contests where handicapping is
implemented.
It has previously been shown that effort, particularly from weaker participants, is higher
in even contests (see, for example, Che and Gale (1998)). Studies such as Tsoulouhas et al.
(2007) argue against such policies – common in workplace environments (Pfeifer (2011)) – as
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they may reduce the ability of the future players in a repeated setting. However, our results
shed light on the possible harmful effects of levelling the contest even in a static setting, as
it appears to incentivize sabotage.
Our results are of particular interest in settings such as workplaces, political campaigns,
and sports, in which it is possible for players to sabotage rivals. (Contests in which players
cannot access their rivals – e.g. applications to colleges, innovation tournaments etc. – will
be safe from the implications of our results). This means that capping campaign budgets in
political races, handicapping ‘superstar’ workers in internal labour markets, or giving head-
starts to local companies may even result in lower welfare than the status-quo.11 As there are
both benefits, in terms of higher effort, and damage – in terms of sabotage – in levelling the
playing field, our results also suggest that an optimal level of handicapping could be chosen
to elicit the highest net constructive effort in a contest.
11Several designs popularly used to reduce sabotage (see Chowdhury and Gürtler (2015)) are not necessarily
employable in every setting. Sabotage might be reduced by introducing detection procedure and punishments,
but these also incur individual and social costs.
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Tables
Table 1. Summary Statistics 1 2 3 4 5
Races All (N=19,635) Hcap (N=11,766) Non Hcap (N=7,869) Jump (N=6,631) Flat (N=13,004)
No. of Runners 9.332 9.793 8.642 8.811 9.598
(3.448) (3.427) (3.363) (3.586) (3.345)
Win Prize Money (000s of GBP) 9.661 7.395 13.048 9.102 9.946
(33.85) (17.341) (48.899) (26.318) (37.109)
Distance (000s of yards) 2.748 2.766 2.72 4.443 1.884
(1.407) (1.436) (1.362) (.751) (.7)
Horse Runs All (N=183,046) Hcap (N=115,023) Non Hcap (N=68,023) Jump (N=58,417) Flat (N=124,629)
Age (Years) 4.995 5.453 4.218 6.877 4.112
(2.3) (2.288) (2.103) (2.018) (1.849)
Implied Win Probability 0.123 0.118 0.132 0.129 0.12
(.114) (.089) (.147) (.124) (.109)
Summary statistics for 19,635 horse races in the U.K. in 2011 and 2012. Column 1 encompasses the full sample, with sub-samples relating to
handicap races, non-handicap races, jump races, and flat races in columns 2, 3, 4 and 5 respectively. The top panel focuses on race statistics with
individual horse statistics in the bottom panel. The main measure is the mean, with standard deviations in parentheses. Implied Win Probability
is calculated as 1/(SP+1) where SP is the starting price odds (a summary measure of British bookmaking odds at the start of the race).
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Table 2. Sabotage
Dependent Variable: Saboteur All All
Intercept -5.38*** -5.65***
(.058) (.203)
Handicap Race 0.402*** 0.453***
(.068) (.076)
Jump Race -0.999***
(.148)
Top Class Race 0.31**
(.105)
No. of Runners 0.011
(.008)
Win Prize Money (000s of GBP) 0.0002
(.0008)
Distance (000s of yards) -0.125**
(.045)
Age 0.083
(.075)
Age2 -0.006
(.006)
Implied Win Probability 2.628***
(.196)
No. of Clusters (Races) 19,635 19,635
No. of Obs. where Dep. Var.=1 1,099 1,099
No. of Obs. 183,046 183,046
Pseudo R2 0.0028 0.031
Coefficient estimates when an indicator variable equalling 1 if the jockey was guilty of sabotage, and 0
otherwise, was regressed on an indicator variable equalling 1 if the horse was racing in a handicap race, and
0 otherwise. A logit specification was used and control variables were added in regression 2. (Races of class
1 or 2 are designated as top class). Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors (clustered at the race level)
are in parentheses and ***, **,*, and . indicates significance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.
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Table 3. Sabotage: Jockey Fixed Effects
Dependent Variable: Saboteur All All
Handicap Race 0.282*** 0.383***
(.069) (.078)
Jump Race -0.413.
(.241)
Top Class Race 0.409**
(.108)
No. of Runners 0.013
(.009)
Win Prize Money (000s of GBP) 0.0002
(.0008)
Distance (000s of yards) -0.05
(.051)
Age 0.06
(.072)
Age2 -0.007
(.006)
Implied Win Probability 2.8***
(.243)
Jockey Fixed Effects Yes Yes
No. of Clusters (Jockeys) 328 328
No. of Obs. 144,452 144,452
Coefficient estimates when an indicator variable equalling 1 if the jockey was guilty of sabotage, and 0
otherwise, was regressed on an indicator variable equalling 1 if the horse was racing in a handicap race, and
0 otherwise. Jockey fixed effects are included in these regressions. A logit specification was used and control
variables were added in regression 2. (Races of class 1 or 2 are designated as top class). Heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors (clustered at the jockey level) are in parentheses and ***, **,*, and . indicates
significance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.
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Table 4. Sabotage: Further Analysis
Dependent Variable: Saboteur All Handicap Non-Handicap
Intercept -5.193*** -5.35*** -4.113***
(.251) (.334) (.391)
Std. Dev. of IWP in Race -2.845** -2.931* -3.767**
(.977) (1.491) (1.342)
Handicap Race 0.329***
(.086)
Jump Race -0.991*** -1.457*** -0.232
(.149) (.194) (.246)
Top Class Race 0.287** 0.281* 0.264
(.104) (.136) (.169)
No. of Runners -0.002 0.018 -0.047*
(.009) (.012) (.019)
Win Prize Money (000s of GBP) 0.0003 -0.001 0.0008
(.0008) (.002) (.0008)
Distance (000s of yards) -0.12** -0.021 -0.29**
(.045) (.053) (.094)
Age 0.083 0.102 -0.041
(.075) (.099) (.119)
Age2 -0.006 -0.009 0.01
(.006) (.009) (.01)
Implied Win Probability 2.911*** 3.639*** 2.282***
(.24) (.365) (.321)
No. of Clusters (Races) 19,635 11,766 7,869
No. of Obs. where Dep. Var.=1 1,099 787 312
No. of Obs. 183,046 115,023 68,023
Pseudo R2 0.0317 0.0338 0.0277
Coefficient estimates when an indicator variable equalling 1 if the jockey was guilty of sabotage, and 0
otherwise, was regressed on the standard deviation of implied win probability within the race and the control
variables from Table 2. In the second and third regressions we break the sample down into handicap and
non-handicap races respectively. A logit specification was used, heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors
(clustered at the race level) are in parentheses, and ***, **,*, and . indicates significance at the 0.1%, 1%,
5%, and 10% level respectively.
28
Sabotage in Handicap Contests
Table 5: Effect of Sabotage
Panel A: Wins
Dependent Variable: Winner All Hcap Non Hcap Jump Flat
Intercept -3.267*** -3.29*** -3.347*** -3.256*** -3.275***
(.011) (.015) (.018) (.019) (.0138)
Saboteur 1.08*** 1.018*** 1.181*** 1.5*** 1.016***
(.077) (.093) (.145) (.201) (.084)
Implied Win Probability 7.115*** 7.683*** 6.946*** 7.011*** 7.182***
(.06) (.092) (.083) (.097) (.076)
No. of Clusters (Races) 19,635 11,766 7,869 6,631 13,004
No. of Obs. where Dep. Var.=1 19,635 11,766 7,869 6,631 13,004
No. of Obs. 183,046 115,023 68,023 58,417 124,629
Pseudo R2 0.1372 0.0955 0.2042 0.1527 0.1293
Panel B: Relative Performance
Dependent Variable: Performance All Hcap Non Hcap Jump Flat
Intercept -0.294*** -0.328*** -0.237*** -0.265*** -0.308***
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.002) (.001)
Saboteur 0.153*** 0.158*** 0.139*** 0.168*** 0.162***
(.006) (.008) (.011) (.017) (.007)
Predicted Percentile 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.005***
(.00002) (.00002) (.00003) (.00003) (.00002)
No. of Clusters (Races) 19,635 11,766 7,869 6,631 13,004
No. of Obs. 171,991 108,045 63,946 48,054 123,937
R2 0.2954 0.3278 0.2403 0.3494 0.2826
Two sets of regressions to establish the benefits that accrue to the saboteur as a result of sabotage. Panel A displays coefficient
estimates when an indicator variable equalling 1 if the jockey/horse won the race, and 0 otherwise, was regressed on an indicator
variable equalling 1 if the jockey was guilty of sabotage during the race, and 0 otherwise, and the implied win probability (as
inferred from the odds). The full sample is analysed in regression 1, with sub-samples relating to handicap, non-handicap, jump
and flat races following. Panel B displays coefficient estimates when Performance, as defined in Equation (5), was regressed
on an indicator variable equalling 1 if the jockey was guilty of sabotage during the race, and 0 otherwise, and the predicted
percentile of the horse (as inferred from an ordering of betting odds within the race). Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard
errors, clustered at the race level, are in parentheses, and ***, **,*, and . indicates significance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5%, and 10%
level respectively.
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Figures
Figure 1: The average win indicator for saboteurs (red), victims of sabotage (green), and
uninvolved third parties (blue). Averages are calculated for each subgroup, and for each
implied win probability (inferred from the betting odds) rounded to the nearest 0.01.
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Figure 2: The average performance (as defined in Equation (5)) of saboteurs (red), victims of
sabotage (green), and uninvolved third parties (blue). Average performance is calculated for
each subgroup, and for each predicted percentile (as inferred from the betting odds) rounded
to the nearest whole number.
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